



THE MULTIPLE DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY:  TESTING LAY 
“EXPECTATIONS OF PRIVACY”* 




In Georgia v. Randolph,1 the U.S. Supreme Court saw new Chief Jus-
tice John Roberts’s first written dissent.2  In somewhat barbed lan-
guage,3 the Chief Justice challenged the majority’s perspective on 
what properly characterized the defendant’s, and society’s, expecta-
tions of privacy.  Forty years of Supreme Court jurisprudence has ex-
plicitly relied on gauging such expectations, since Justice Harlan in-
dicated in Katz v. United States his “understanding” that “there is a 
twofold requirement [in determining the scope of Fourth Amend-
ment protection], first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjec-
tive) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one 
that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”4  The dispute in 
Randolph turned not only on the reasonableness of the defendant’s 
subjective expectation of privacy, but also on the reasonableness of 
society’s relatively more objective understandings of social custom 
and of what might reasonably constitute an inappropriate interfer-
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 1 547 U.S. 103 (2006). 
 2 Id. at 127 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 3 See The Supreme Court, 2005 Term—Leading Cases, 120 HARV. L. REV. 125, 166–67 (2006) 
(stating that the Chief Justice’s dissent “[c]riticiz[ed] the majority’s reasoning as mis-
guided, its rule as arbitrary, and its result as dangerous . . . .”). 
 4 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
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ence in that privacy.5  As in most Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, 
both Justice Souter, who wrote for the Court, and Chief Justice Rob-
erts in dissent, made explicit psychological assumptions about per-
ceptions and expectations of privacy, assumptions that are not neces-
sarily supported by empirical findings.6 
The Court’s reliance on assumptions about individuals’ and soci-
ety’s expectations, perceptions, and understandings of that nebulous 
notion of “privacy” highlights the importance of empirical research 
into such understanding.7  As with any body of law, where psychologi-
cal assumptions can be replaced—or at the very least supple-
mented—by psychological fact, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence 
can be challenged or supported, but in any case substantially en-
riched. 
Little relevant empirical research has been conducted on percep-
tions of privacy, however, most of it by the same few researchers.8  
Studies have examined, for instance, perceptions of privacy in the 
context of consent searches,9 the degree of intrusiveness that charac-
terizes various searches,10 differences between the perceptions of ob-
servers and consentors in the degree of choice the consentor had to 
consent to a police request,11 differences between lay and police per-
 
 5 Cf. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 144 n.12 (1978) (noting the importance to Fourth 
Amendment protection of “understandings that are recognized and permitted by soci-
ety”). 
 6 Indeed, findings from nearly twenty years before Randolph show that both Justices’ cur-
rent assumptions were faulty.  Dorothy K. Kagehiro & Ralph B. Taylor, Third-Party Consent 
Searches:  Legal vs. Social Perceptions of “Common Authority,” 18 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1274 
(1988); see also Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Rating the Intrusiveness of 
Law Enforcement Searches and Seizures, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 183, 198–99 (1993) (collect-
ing data on lay perceptions and arguing as a result that Fourth Amendment doctrine “is 
based on flawed assumptions about society’s perspective on privacy”). 
 7 Steven L. Chanenson, Get the Facts, Jack!  Empirical Research and the Changing Constitutional 
Landscape of Consent Searches, 71 TENN. L. REV. 399, 437 (2004). 
 8 Professor Chanenson characterizes such research as “meager,” a better description than 
“nonexistent,” which one commentator he cites uses.  See id. at 447 & n.297.  The com-
mentator there alleged that “[n]o published data currently exist on consent 
searches . . . . [which] leaves a significant gap in the legal and social science literature.”  
Id.  As sketched below, the literature does (and did) exist—though it is lamentably sparse, 
a situation we seek to help remedy here. 
 9 See Dorothy K. Kagehiro, Psycholegal Research on the Fourth Amendment, 1 PSYCHOL. SCI. 187 
(1990) (reviewing some similar research). 
 10 Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 6; Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, 
Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases:  An Empirical Look 
at “Understandings Recognized and Permitted By Society,” 42 DUKE L.J. 727 (1993) [hereinafter 
Slobogin & Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations]. 
 11 Dorothy K. Kagehiro, Perceived Voluntariness of Consent to Warrantless Police Searches, 18 J. 
APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 38 (1988). 
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ceptions of third-party consentors’ authority,12 or potential hindsight 
biases in the evaluation of such third-party consent searches.13  How-
ever, such research has itself proceeded from only vague assumptions 
about what constitutes perceptions of “privacy” in the first place.  De-
spite recent efforts to organize legal understandings of privacy,14 both 
research and case law still seem to proceed from a perception of pri-
vacy overall as “a unitary concept with a uniform value.”15  Even in the 
context of Fourth Amendment search and seizure, privacy has been 
primarily seen as unidimensional, focusing, for instance, on a broad 
notion of “intrusiveness” or, consistent with doctrinal language but 
using broad terms, on violations of an individual’s “expectations of 
privacy.” 
In the present research, however, we present a finer-grained pic-
ture of perceptions of privacy.  By empirically identifying the multiple 
dimensions that lay individuals use in determining whether a law en-
forcement official has interfered with a citizen’s privacy in the Fourth 
Amendment context, we begin to unpack the different elements that 
go into “reasonable” expectations of privacy.  As explained below, we 
present here an empirical study using the multidimensional scaling 
methodology, identifying the dimensions that laypeople use in evalu-
ating “privacy.”16  By articulating those dimensions we are able to go 
further than previous empirical research in understanding percep-
 
 12 Dorothy K. Kagehiro et al., Social Perceptions of Third-Party Consent and the Reasonableness 
Test of Illinois v. Rodriguez, 29 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 217 (1992).  But cf. Lior Jacob 
Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 919, 934 n.35 (2005) 
(“[I]n the Fourth Amendment context, the law deems the government agents’ expecta-
tions of the plaintiff’s privacy irrelevant.  Rather, the law focuses only on what the subject 
of the search expected, and whether those expectations were reasonable.”). 
 13 Dorothy K. Kagehiro et al., Hindsight Bias and Third-Party Consentors to Warrantless Police 
Searches, 15 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 305 (1991). 
 14 Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477 (2006) [hereinafter Solove, 
Taxonomy]; Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1087 (2002). 
 15 Solove, Taxonomy, supra note 14, at 480.  That is, to the extent there is agreement on its 
scope in the first place.  See id. at 479–80 (“Privacy is a chameleon-like word . . . . [It] is 
vague and evanescent, protean, and suffer[s] from an embarrassment of meanings.  Per-
haps the most striking thing about the right to privacy, philosopher Judith Jarvis Thom-
son has observed, is that nobody seems to have any very clear idea what it is.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (footnotes omitted)); see also Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth 
Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV. 503, 505 (2007) (“The Court’s handiwork has been 
condemned as distressingly unmanageable, unstable, and a series of inconsistent and bi-
zarre results that [the Court] has left entirely undefended.” (alteration in original) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted) (footnotes omitted)). 
 16 In ongoing studies, we experimentally manipulate the dimensions identified here in dif-
ferent ways to further investigate perceptions and expectations of privacy, individual dif-
ferences therein, and the malleability of such perceptions. 
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tions of privacy; we are able to assess the psychological validity of the 
Court’s assumptions about individuals’ subjective privacy expecta-
tions, as well as those about society’s views of those perceptions.  As a 
result, we are able to evaluate and inform existing Fourth Amend-
ment doctrine.  We also identify areas and methods for further em-
pirical research.  In part, we hope, our research is thus a step in ad-
dressing recurring lamentations about the difficulty of identifying 
what is considered “reasonable” in the privacy context,17 a step in 
avoiding what some see as indeterminate and arbitrary Fourth 
Amendment decision-making,18 and a step toward a fuller empirical 
picture of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
A.  Randolph and Perceptions of Privacy 
In Randolph, police arrived at the residence of a married but es-
tranged couple in response to a domestic dispute.  In discussion with 
one of the policemen, the wife, Janet Randolph, mentioned drug use 
by her husband, Scott, and volunteered that there was drug para-
phernalia in the house.19  When asked by the policeman for permis-
sion to search the house, Scott Randolph “unequivocally refused.”20 
After Scott’s refusal, the policeman asked Janet’s permission to 
search the house, which she “readily gave,” and led the policeman 
into a room she described as Scott’s bedroom.21  There, the police-
man observed material he believed was cocaine.  The policeman left 
the house and contacted the local district attorney, who instructed 
him to obtain a search warrant; after obtaining a warrant and return-
ing to search the house again, police obtained drug-related items that 
led to an indictment of Scott Randolph for drug possession.22 
 
 17 E.g., Kerr, supra note 15, at 504 (“[N]o one knows when society might opt to ‘recognize’ 
or ‘permit’ [an understanding].  Who is ‘society,’ and how do Supreme Court Justices 
know what it thinks?”); see also ROBERT M. BLOOM, SEARCHES, SEIZURES, AND WARRANTS 46 
(2003) (“How do we know what society is prepared to recognize as reasonable?”). 
 18 2005 Term—Leading Cases, supra note 3, at 168–69 (criticizing a focus on “social expecta-
tions of privacy” as allowing judicial outcomes to depend on judicial assumptions about 
those expectations, and suggesting that such “indeterminacy” leads to “instability and un-
predictability”). 
 19 See Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 107 (2006). 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. 
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Scott Randolph’s efforts to suppress the evidence at trial were un-
successful.  Although he argued that his wife did not have authority 
to consent to a search over his express refusal, the trial court ruled 
that she had common authority over the house which authorized her 
to consent to a search even over his refusal.  State appellate courts 
disagreed, however, and reversed the trial court’s ruling, emphasizing 
that “the consent to conduct a warrantless search of a residence given 
by one occupant is not valid in the face of the refusal of another oc-
cupant who is physically present at the scene to permit a warrantless 
search.”23 
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed.  Justice Souter’s opinion for the 
majority turned in part on consensually held conceptions regarding 
expectations of privacy.  Although not always explicitly, the analysis 
moved between Katz’s two features:  the reasonableness of a consent 
search—here, when the consent given is by a third party—derives in 
part from an occupant’s expectations of privacy,24 and in part from 
society’s understanding of the consentor’s authority to do so.25  
Throughout, Justice Souter appealed to “common understand-
ing[s],”26 “social practice,”27 “the authority recognized by customary 
social usage,”28 and “social custom”29 regarding such expectations, us-
ing his understanding of such custom to buttress his assertions about 
how individuals would behave in various social situations—and con-
sequently his ruling that such understandings precluded one co-
occupant from granting permission to search over the objection of 
another physically present co-occupant. 
To Justice Souter, this was hardly a novel approach; he asserted 
that a central feature of evaluating whether a search is reasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment “is the great significance given to 
widely shared social expectations” about privacy.30  Chief Justice Rob-
erts, joined by Justice Scalia, disagreed.  In particular, the Chief Jus-
tice objected to the majority’s assumptions about social custom, both 
its relevance and its content.31  First, the dissent expressly rejected the 
 
 23 Id. at 108 (citing Georgia v. Randolph, 278 Ga. 614 (2004)). 
 24 Id. at 112 (reviewing expectations of tenant or hotel guest regarding landlord’s or hotel 
manager’s authority to admit others over occupant’s objection). 
 25 Id. at 111; see also id. at 112 (“[N]o one would reasonably expect . . . a child 
to . . . authorize anyone to rummage through his parents’ bedroom.”). 
 26 Id. at 114. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. at 121. 
 29 Id. at 120. 
 30 Id. at 111. 
 31 Id. at 127–32 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
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claim that those “widely shared social expectations” are an important 
feature in evaluating whether a search is reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment.32  Someone who shares ownership or occupancy of 
property might expect a co-owner to behave in certain ways, in par-
ticular against third parties, but those expectations do not involve pri-
vacy—for the dissent, privacy as to that shared property has already 
been abandoned.33  Thus, the Chief Justice rejected the assertion that 
those social expectations played an appropriate role in Fourth 
Amendment doctrine.  Second, he suggested, the majority’s under-
standing of the substance of those expectations—regardless of their 
relevance—was likely incorrect.34  Social custom may shape expecta-
tions about co-owners’ or co-occupants’ interactions and behavior, 
but there was no reason to think that the majority’s perspective on 
those expectations and interactions was any more correct than the 
dissent’s, and thus even less reason to conform constitutional proce-
dure to them.35 
Both majority and dissent—though in very different ways—thus 
focused on “social custom [and] its reflection in private law,”36 but 
disagreed sharply over the importance of grounding Fourth Amend-
ment jurisprudence in customary perceptions of what constitutes pri-
vacy (and therefore of invasions of privacy).  Importantly for present 
purposes, at least part of the disagreement turned on the substance 
of the Justices’ assumptions about perceptions and expectations of 
privacy.  Again, the focus on custom has been a recurring focus of 
search-and-seizure doctrine at the very least since Katz.  But again, 
there has been surprisingly little empirical research into the content 
of individuals’ and society’s understanding of what “privacy” com-
prises.  Further, the previously conducted research proceeded from a 
priori assumptions about how people perceive privacy, assumptions 
that we seek here to evaluate empirically.  That is, in helping to lay 
the groundwork for an updated, more thorough empirical investiga-
 
 32 Id. at 131. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. at 130 (discussing the futility of basing a constitutional rule on varying degrees of ex-
pectations due to an unlimited number of scenarios). 
 35 There are thus faint echoes in the Chief Justice’s dissent of Justice Scalia’s reluctance to 
privilege public opinion (in the form, for instance, of opinion polls) in the context of 
Eighth Amendment capital jurisprudence.  See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 616–
18 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (explaining that courts are “ill-equipped” to interpret 
measurements of public opinion).  One might speculate whether any aspect of these 
echoes supported Justice Scalia’s decision to join the Chief Justice’s dissent. 
 36 See Randolph, 547 U.S. at 120. 
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tion into perceptions of privacy, we begin by examining the underly-
ing features or dimensions that constitute those perceptions. 
B.  Previous Empirical Research 
Above, we sketched—quite roughly—the doctrinal basis for 
courts’ focus on psychological perceptions of and expectations about 
privacy.  After now briefly reviewing some of the existing empirical 
research on such perceptions, we turn to a more detailed account of 
our present study. 
Although Katz identified the importance of insight into real-world 
understandings regarding privacy and intrusions thereon, it took two 
decades before research investigated those understandings empiri-
cally.  Early work applied attribution theory and speech-act theory 
from social psychology, investigating whether different participants in 
a consent request situation might attribute acquiescence differently.  
In particular, consistent with attribution theory, consentors might at-
tribute any consent given to a perceived coercive nature of the situa-
tion, while observers—e.g., judges—might attribute consent disposi-
tionally, that is, to the actor giving consent.37  Consistent with speech-
act theory, consentors might perceive their freedom to deny an offi-
cial request differently based on its phrasing; for instance, more per-
ceived freedom when the request was phrased interrogatively (“May I 
come in?”) than when phrased declaratively (“I am coming in.”).38  In 
empirical tests, both of these hypotheses were supported, suggesting 
to the researcher that in the context of suppression hearings, a judge 
might inaccurately assess the defendant’s understanding of the situa-
tion, his intent, and his perceptions of coercion, and thus be more 
likely to rule particular evidence admissible.39 
Subsequent research by that researcher and her colleagues exam-
ined perceptions close to the Randolph circumstances.40  Kagehiro and 
Taylor noted a jurisdictional split as of 1988 regarding consent au-
thority as to a shared residence, and tested lay perceptions of the 
“common authority” identified in Matlock as necessary for validating a 
co-occupant’s consent to search the shared residence when the other 
resident was present or absent—that is, whether joint consent was 
necessary under such circumstances.  In their study, when the co-
 
 37 Kagehiro, supra note 11, at 40. 
 38 Id. 
 39 See Kagehiro, supra note 9, at 189 (reviewing this research). 
 40 Kagehiro & Taylor, supra note 6. 
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resident was described as absent, subjects saw the present occupant as 
more authorized to allow a law enforcement official to enter41 and to 
search common areas (e.g., a dining area) than when the co-resident 
was present and protested.42  However, that authorization did not ex-
tend to more personal domains of the other resident, such as his 
bedroom, or a personal container in the bedroom, or even in a com-
mon area.43  Thus, lay perceptions of such common authority were 
more nuanced than either opinion in Randolph might suggest. 
Such nuance in one sense supports the Chief Justice’s point that 
the different situations that might be presented to a potential consen-
tor are quite varied, undercutting the majority’s broad claim about 
social custom.44  But the psychological assumptions underlying his re-
buttal to the majority also seem flawed; for instance, in the same 
study, the researchers examined the very privacy that the Chief Jus-
tice discussed.45  In addition to asking subjects whether an occupant 
could grant permission to someone else to enter and/or search, the 
researchers asked whether that occupant could in fact search and ex-
amine the bedroom or the personal container.  Contrary to the Chief 
Justice’s doctrine-based assertion that the owner of the bedroom or 
container “has given up his privacy with respect to his roommate,”46 
subjects presumed that the occupant had virtually no right to do so.47 
Subsequent refinement of this third-party consent research varied 
the identity of the third-party consentor, presenting a range of ex-
perimental vignette conditions to both undergraduates and law en-
forcement officials (detectives from the Philadelphia Police Depart-
ment).48  Undergraduate perceptions of consent reasonableness—
and, surprisingly, those of detectives—differed from that which 
courts would tend to approve:  both students and detectives tended to 
approve of third-party consent only when the third party seemed to 
 
 41 The researchers also varied the identity of the individual requesting permission to enter 
and/or search:  in different experimental conditions the “intruder” was a friend, a re-
pairman, a housing inspector, or a police officer.  See Kagehiro, supra note 9, at 190.  The 
different identities did not seem to affect the results.  Id. at 191. 
 42 This seems consistent with Matlock.  See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 n.7 
(1974) (noting a co-inhabitant’s assumption of the risk that another inhabitant might 
“permit [a] common area to be searched”). 
 43 Kagehiro & Taylor, supra note 6. 
 44 Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 130 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“The possible 
scenarios are limitless, and slight variations in the fact pattern yield vastly different expec-
tations about whether the invitee might be expected to enter or to go away.”). 
 45 Id. at 131. 
 46 Id. (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 117 (1984)). 
 47 Kagehiro & Taylor, supra note 6. 
 48 Kagehiro et al., supra note 12. 
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have both a high degree of social intimacy (e.g., a co-resident versus 
an interior housepainter) and a high degree of “place control” (e.g., 
a mutual friend hired to housepainter versus a weekend guest, or the 
friend of the consentor; but not the suspect).  Courts, in contrast, 
tend to focus less on social intimacy and more on place control.49 
Despite calls for “continued empirical exploration of the basic 
tenets” of search and seizure law,50 little such investigation followed.  
One legal scholar with Fourth Amendment expertise51 investigated lay 
perceptions of the “intrusiveness” of different types of conduct by law 
enforcement officials.52  Emphasizing the relevance of community 
values not only to expectations of privacy, but also to perceptions of 
intrusiveness, Slobogin and Schumacher asked subjects to rank the 
intrusiveness of fifty different examples of police conduct taken pri-
marily from Supreme Court and other federal case law.  Building on 
the research by Kagehiro and colleagues outlined above, they ex-
pected to find a disconnect between lay perceptions and black letter 
law.53  Their results were both consistent with and divergent from 
Fourth Amendment doctrine.  First, their respondents considered 
several types of conduct that the Court would subject to heightened 
scrutiny to be relatively intrusive.  They also considered certain con-
duct that the Court would deem less objectionable to be relatively un-
intrusive.54  But except at these relatively clear extremes, there ap-
peared to be strong disagreement with existing case law over the 
degree to which certain conduct violates expectations of privacy.  For 
 
 49 See Kagehiro, supra note 9, at 191. 
 50 Id. at 192. 
 51 See Christopher Slobogin, The World Without a Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1 
(1991); see also CHARLES WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
(1993). 
 52 See Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 6; Slobogin & Schumacher, Reasonable Expecta-
tions, supra note 10. 
 53 In this, they reflect other research in the criminal law context that compares lay percep-
tions to doctrine and discusses the implications of disparities between the two.  E.g., PAUL 
H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY AND BLAME (1995) (comparing lay 
perceptions of appropriateness of guilt and punishment across a number of different 
criminal scenarios with guilt and punishment as assigned by the Model Penal Code).  For 
a critical discussion of such work, see Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Who Decides?  Privileging Pub-
lic Sentiment About Justice and the Substantive Law, 72 UMKC L. REV. 1 (2003) [hereinafter 
Blumenthal, Who Decides?].  Similar work has recently been conducted examining lay per-
ceptions of the seriousness of crimes.  See Paul H. Robinson & Robert Kurzban, Concor-
dance and Conflict in Intuitions of Justice, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1829, 1866–90 (2007).  For a dis-
cussion and development of that work, see Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Perceptions of Crime:  A 
Multidimensional Analysis with Implications for Law and Psychology, 38 MCGEORGE L. REV. 629 
(2007) [hereinafter Blumenthal, Perceptions of Crime]. 
 54 Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 6, at 187–90. 
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instance, subjects rated several types of conduct intrusive that the 
Court has ruled do not involve substantial expectations of privacy, 
such as the use of hypodermic needles and urine samples to test for 
drug use.55  Similarly, subjects rated as intrusive certain conduct that 
the Court has ruled were not even “searches” within the meaning of 
the Fourth Amendment, such as dog sniffs, entry into privately owned 
“open fields,” and boarding a bus and asking passengers to consent to 
a search of their luggage.56 
The authors developed three hypotheses to explain their results:  
the “inference of guilt” theory, where searches and seizures of people 
who appear guilty are ranked less intrusive than ones of people who 
appear innocent57; the “dangerousness” theory, where perceived in-
trusiveness varies inversely with the perceived dangerousness of the 
suspected activity58; and the “implied consent” theory, where per-
ceived intrusiveness varies inversely with the protective motivation of 
the searchers.59  As the authors pointed out, only the third is consis-
tent with the values underlying Fourth Amendment doctrine.  To the 
extent that judges ruling on admissibility focus on a defendant’s per-
ceived guilt or dangerousness—as did Slobogin and Schumacher’s 
subjects—too much evidence might be ruled admissible.60  Our pre-
sent study helps assess whether these factors are ones that laypeople 
consider when evaluating notions of “privacy.” 
Finally, the most recent empirical investigation involved archival 
research into rates at which consent was given in the context of Ohio 
traffic stops.61  The author, Lichtenberg, first found that a substantial 
majority of those stopped (89%) consented to a search, with about 
13% of searches resulting in drugs being found.62  Further, he took 
advantage of the fact that the time period studied crossed the date of 
the Ohio Supreme Court’s State v. Robinette decision, in which that 
 
 55 Id. at 190. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. at 191–92. 
 58 Id. at 193. 
 59 Id. at 194. 
 60 See id. at 195–96.  This concern is consistent with findings that observers are subject to the 
hindsight bias in evaluating consent.  See Kagehiro et al., supra note 13 (demonstrating 
this point empirically); cf. William J. Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77 
VA. L. REV. 881 (1991) (making a similar point). 
 61 See Chanenson, supra note 7, at 451–55 (summarizing study by Illya D. Lichtenberg, Vol-
untary Consent or Obedience to Authority:  An Inquiry into the “Consensual” Police-
Citizen Encounter (1999) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Rutgers University) (on file 
with author)).  We do not discuss here the literature on racial profiling and traffic stops. 
 62 See Chanenson, supra note 7, at 452. 
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court ruled that consent to search could only be requested once an 
individual was told that she was free to leave the situation.63  He 
found, however, that Robinette did not seem to have a substantial ef-
fect on compliance rates.64  The most notable finding seemed to 
combine these two results.  That is, Lichtenberg argued that indi-
viduals provided consent almost exclusively because they were afraid 
of the consequences if they refused; he also observed that most indi-
viduals reported not knowing that they in fact had a legal right to re-
fuse.65  This appears consistent with critics of consent doctrine who 
argue that formalistic search requests made by law enforcement offi-
cials may be construed by suspects quite differently from the way the 
Supreme Court presumes.66  Although there are a number of caveats 
to and inferences made from the study, again, this seems to indicate a 
gap in the Court’s assumptions about the way real people think and 
act in the real world, emphasizing the need for more such informa-
tion and research. 
C.  Present Study 
Taken together, this small body of empirical research on consent 
and perceptions or expectations of privacy documents that gap, sug-
gesting that lay perceptions in fact differ from Supreme Court doc-
trine—at times substantially.  But that research itself begins from a 
priori assumptions about such perceptions that themselves have not 
been fully examined—for instance, that there is consensus about 
what is meant by “privacy,” even if that consensus is articulated with 
difficulty.67  To take privacy as a unitary concept with a uniform val-
ue68 may be to operate at too high a level of abstraction, giving rise to 
the sort of indeterminacy and arbitrariness decried by commentators.  
Efforts to taxonomize types and notions of privacy are an important 
step in parsing what is meant by privacy, but these particular recent 
efforts focus on description and categorization, trying to make sense 
of existing doctrine.69  A complementary approach is the empirical 
 
 63 State v. Robinette, 653 N.E.2d 695 (Ohio 1995), rev’d, 519 U.S. 33 (1996). 
 64 See Chanenson, supra note 7, at 452–53. 
 65 Id. at 454 (quoting Lichtenberg, supra note 61). 
 66 See, e.g., Daniel L. Rotenberg, An Essay on Consent(less) Police Searches, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 
175, 187–90 (observing the extent to which the authoritative presence of police officers 
influences consent); William J. Stuntz, Terry’s Impossibility, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1213, 
1215 (1998) (noting the varied application of the Terry reasonable suspicion standard). 
 67 See supra notes 14–15. 
 68 Solove, Taxonomy, supra note 15, at 480. 
 69 Id.; Kerr, supra note 15. 
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one we take here, focusing on lay perceptions of what constitutes pri-
vacy and thus violations of privacy.  Our efforts here are closest to 
Slobogin and Schumacher’s approach, but we expand upon their 
work in a number of ways. 
First, their research was published in 1993, and it may thus be use-
ful to examine whether, and the extent to which, expectations of pri-
vacy have changed.  Especially in the post-9/11-reform atmosphere of 
legislative and media attention to government incursion into indi-
viduals’ private lives, there is a very real possibility that such expecta-
tions may differ from over a decade ago.  Second, Slobogin and 
Schumacher focused only on one variable, “intrusiveness,” which—
though suggested by doctrine—might itself be overly broad.  Al-
though they present interesting possibilities for factors subjects may 
have considered in interpreting that variable,70 the methodology they 
selected constrained them to evaluate their stimuli across only one 
dimension.  Accordingly, third, in examining perceptions and expec-
tations of privacy, we used multidimensional scaling (“MDS”), a 
methodology explicitly designed to help identify underlying factors 
or dimensions that constitute broader variables, rather than focusing 
on ranking stimuli along a variable selected a priori. 
More specifically, by thus working in a “bottom-up” rather than 
“top-down” fashion, MDS is a procedure that helps researchers un-
cover “hidden structures” in existing data by graphically plotting re-
spondents’ perceptions of perceived similarities (or dissimilarities) 
among various stimuli.71  When these stimuli are located on a plot 
based on such perceptions, underlying dimensions that respondents 
may have used (consciously or not) can be inferred.72  For instance, 
subjects might be asked to rate the similarity of countries in the 
world, and a plot made of those similarity rankings.  The resulting 
plot might look like a map of the world.  This could suggest that sub-
jects were implicitly or explicitly using dimensions involving distance 
or direction—in particular, dimensions of north/south and 
east/west.  But the plot might line up the stimuli on a single axis go-
ing from largest to smallest, or most to least economically developed, 
or most to least familiar, or even alphabetical, suggesting that subjects 
used that single dimension in rating and organizing the countries.  
Inferring which dimension is important to respondents helps under-
 
 70 See supra notes 57–59. 
 71 Blumenthal, Perceptions of Crime, supra note 53, at 632. 
 72 JOSEPH B. KRUSKAL & MYRON WISH, MULTIDIMENSIONAL SCALING 5–10 (1978). 
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stand the way in which they see the world (in this example, literally), 
and what factors are important to them.73 
Finally, by also obtaining explicit ratings of the stimuli on previ-
ously selected dimensions, we can also statistically correlate ratings on 
the inferred dimensions with the explicit ratings, in order to examine 
the degree of fit there.  Dimensions we identify can be manipulated 
experimentally or otherwise examined further in subsequent re-
search.74 
II.  METHODOLOGY 
A. Materials and Administration 
With continuity and consistency in mind, we used the stimuli from 
Slobogin and Schumacher’s studies, along with one additional stimu-
lus reflecting the Randolph fact pattern.75  Each stimulus was a sen-
tence summarizing the search at issue in a particular case.  All testing 
was conducted over the Internet though a secure connection.76  Par-
ticipants saw stimuli presented in pairs on the screen and rated how 
similar they felt each pair of stimuli were using a seven-point scale 
(1 = Extremely Dissimilar; 7 = Extremely Similar).  Participants were 
instructed to rate how similar they felt the scenarios were, “however 
they wanted.”  Stimulus scenarios were randomly assigned to three 
different lists of seventeen items each to minimize fatigue and par-
ticipant burden.  The shortened lists resulted in similarity ratings of 
136 pairwise comparisons.  Additionally, two versions of each list were 
created:  one included a parenthetical describing the context or tar-
get of the search, while the other did not (see Table 1 in Appendix 
for examples).77  Within each list, scenario pairs were presented in a 
single pseudo-random order where terms were equally spaced 
 
 73 Blumenthal, Perceptions of Crime, supra note 53; see also supra note 20 and accompanying 
text. 
 74 See supra note 16. 
 75 See Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 6; Slobogin & Schumacher, Reasonable Expecta-
tions, supra note 10.  A complete list of stimuli appears in Table 1. 
 76 The research was approved by the relevant institutional review board and complied with 
the ethical research guidelines of the American Psychological Association. 
 77 This manipulation reflected Slobogin and Schumacher’s hypothesis that providing raters 
with a specific objective for a search or seizure would lead to lower perceived “intrusive-
ness,” because the search or seizure would seem more justified.  Slobogin & Schumacher, 
supra note 6, at 184–85. 
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throughout the presentation.78  Following the similarity ratings, sce-
narios were presented a second time and participants rated each sce-
nario on objective intrusiveness using a five-point scale (1 = Not at 
All; 5 = Extremely). 
After reading a description of the study and providing informed 
consent, participants were presented with the instructions for the first 
task.  Participants were randomly assigned to one of the six lists:  first 
to one of the three lists of scenarios, and then to either the context or 
no-context version of that particular list. 
B. Participants 
One hundred fifty-nine subjects participated.  All were under-
graduates enrolled in an introductory psychology course (mean edu-
cation level was sophomore year), and received partial course credit 
in exchange for their participation.  Fifty-five percent of the sample 
was female, and the group was 70% Caucasian.  Ages ranged from 19 
to 27 (mean age = 20, s.d. = 1.08). 
Thirty-five percent of the sample self-identified as Democrats, 24% 
identified themselves as Republicans, 14% reported being Independ-
ents, and 1% identified themselves as Libertarians.  Twenty-six per-
cent of participants chose not to report their political affiliation.  
Seven participants indicated that they were citizens of countries other 
than the United States, and these individuals were excluded from 
analyses on the basis that different political systems or cultures may 
alter views of privacy-related situations.79 
III.  RESULTS 
In this Part, we present the results of our MDS and other statistical 
analyses.  First, we briefly describe dependent variables based on sub-
jects’ background characteristics and discuss the effects of those 
demographics on dependent variables.  Second, we demonstrate the 
multidimensional nature of subjects’ judgments about the privacy-
related stimuli, identifying multiple different but related dimensions 
in the relationships underlying those judgments.  Finally, we discuss 
the influence of providing subjects with contextual information about 
each stimulus (in the form of a brief parenthetical describing the 
 
 78 Robert T. Ross, Optimum Orders for the Presentation of Pairs in the Method of Paired Compari-
sons, 25 J. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 375 (1934). 
 79 Two participants indicated previous training in law-related fields; however, these indi-
viduals were not excluded from the analyses. 
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purpose of the search).  In Part IV, we more fully discuss these re-
sults’ implications and extend the discussion to further research. 
A.  Descriptives 
Although subjects rated the objective intrusiveness of each stimu-
lus after rating the similarities of all scenarios, we present those rating 
data here first.  As did Slobogin and Schumacher, we present in Ta-
ble 1 the subjects’ overall rankings, as well as the mean and standard 
deviation of the subjects’ ratings, for all stimuli.  For comparison 
purposes, Table 1 also displays Slobogin and Schumacher’s subjects’ 
rankings, as well as their means and standard deviations.80  Our sub-
jects’ intrusiveness ratings are quite consistent with their results; each 
of our samples correlated highly with their overall data.81 
In addition to the demographic data described above in Part II.B, 
we collected descriptive data on the following dependent variables:  
current place of residence, number of hours spent watching televi-
sion, and political views.  Residence might have affected the subjects’ 
expectations of privacy depending on the degree of autonomy they 
perceived as a result of shared or individual residency, or as a result 
of home-ownership or rental status.82  Television watching may have 
affected responses as a result of culturally-induced perceptions of 
what is acceptable law enforcement conduct.  Finally, different politi-
cal orientations might implicate different perceptions of the value of 
privacy and autonomy, and the consequent appropriateness of law 
enforcement intervention.83 
 
 80 See Slobogin & Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations, supra note 10, at 738–39 tbl.1. 
 81 The samples correlated with their overall ratings as follows:  Sample 1, R(17) = 0.81, 
P < 0.001; Sample 2, R(17) = 0.60, P = 0.011; Sample 3, R(16) = 0.84, P < 0.001; Sample 4, 
R(17) = 0.75, P = 0.001; Sample 5, R(17) = 0.58, P = 0.014; Sample 6, R(16) = 0.83, 
P < 0.001. 
   Note, however, that although we distinguished between contextualized and non-
contextualized ratings, their reported data collapse across all their experimental condi-
tions, including context/no context.  Slobogin & Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations, su-
pra note 10, at 737.  Thus, we highlight the consistency between our studies, although the 
tables and rankings are not perfectly comparable. 
 82 Cf. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986) (“In [areas] intimately linked to the 
home, both physically and psychologically, . . . privacy expectations are most height-
ened.”); Jeremy A. Blumenthal, “To Be Human”:  A Psychological Perspective on Property Law, 
83 TULANE L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (discussing psychological perceptions of and re-
lating to “home”). 
 83 Slobogin and Schumacher also examined political orientation in the context of due 
process/crime control orientations.  Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 6, at 186.  They 
found, in part, that subjects who agreed more strongly with due process values tended to 
rate scenarios as more intrusive.  Id. at 187, 196–97. 
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Of the 159 participants, 79% reported living in the campus dorms, 
approximately 16% reported renting an apartment, 4% reported liv-
ing with their parents, and 1% reported owning their own home.  
One hundred and five participants reported watching less than two 
hours of television per day, 41 reported watching between two and 
four hours of television per day, and the final 13 reported watching 
between four and eight hours of television per day.  However, there 
were no statistically significant differences in intrusiveness ratings for 
any of the scenarios based on the descriptive or demographic data.84 
B.  Multidimensionality 
Participants made similarity ratings of all possible pairs of stimuli.  
Again, these similarity ratings are thought to reflect the implicit cog-
nitive structure participants are imposing on the stimuli.85  As alluded 
to in the Introduction, multidimensional scaling (“MDS”) then allows 
researchers to uncover “hidden structures” or patterns in the data.  
MDS is similar to factor analysis in that it extracts underlying pat-
terns; however, these patterns are represented as dimensions in a vis-
ual plot rather than statistical factors.  MDS statistically extracts n di-
mensions and produces fit values at each level of n to help determine 
which n is the best fit for the data—that is, how many dimensions best 
represent the data.  Traditional indices of fit were employed here:   
Kruskal’s stress index86 and R2.  For Kruskal’s stress index, lower val-
ues indicate better fit; for R2, higher values indicate better fit.87  Stress 
values were graphed to create scree plots for each of the stimuli sets 
(see Figure 1 in Appendix),88 and R2 values appear in Table 2.  As 
demonstrated by these scree plots and by the R2 values, the optimal 
solution for these data consistently yielded three dimensions; that is, 
 
 84 Tests were based on significance at the P = .05 level.  Precise values for these test results 
are available from the authors. 
 85 See supra notes 71–73 and accompanying text (noting that plotting various stimuli based 
on respondents’ perceptions allows for the inference of underlying dimensions, which 
helps understand the way respondents view the world); see also Roger N. Shephard, To-
ward a Universal Law of Generalization for Psychological Science, 237 SCI. 1317 (1987). 
 86 See J.B. Kruskal, Multidimensional Scaling By Optimizing Goodness of Fit to a Nonmetric Hypothe-
sis, 29 PSYCHOMETRIKA 1 (1964) (developing a definition of the stress index). 
 87 See Blumenthal, Perceptions of Crime, supra note 53 (describing stress as a measure of the 
badness of fit and R2 as a measure of goodness of fit); cf. Mark L. Davison & Stephen G. Si-
reci, Multidimensional Scaling, in HANDBOOK OF APPLIED MULTIVARIATE STATISTICS AND 
MATHEMATICAL MODELING 323, 335 (Howard E.A. Tinsley & Steven D. Brown eds., 2000) 
(explaining stress as “an index of the mismatch” between the MDS distances and the da-
ta). 
 88 See Davison & Sireci, supra note 87, at 336. 
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for every sample, solutions with more than three dimensions did not 
result in substantial decreases in stress, or in substantial increases in 
R2.  For clarity, Figures 2 through 7 display these three dimensions in 
two-dimensional form; each figure thus has three sub-parts, (a) 
through (c), plotting each dimension against each of the others.89 
Unsurprisingly, interpretation of MDS plots involves both qualita-
tive and quantitative factors and both objective and subjective inter-
pretation.  Most intuitively, researchers can inspect the resulting plots 
visually, focusing on “whether the dimension is ordering the stimuli 
according to some continuous stimulus characteristic, or grouping 
stimuli according to a discrete characteristic.”90  Thus, in our discus-
sion here we highlight comparisons of stimuli located at different 
ends of the plotted dimensions, as well as similarities in the grouping 
of stimuli at particular coordinates.  We recognize that our interpre-
tations—like most initial MDS interpretations—are “primarily subjec-
tive,”91 and look to our ongoing research to test the dimensions’ ro-
bustness.  Our important points here are to demonstrate that lay 
perceptions of privacy are multidimensional and that providing con-
text affects subjects’ judgments. 
Nevertheless, we are able to infer dimensions from these plots, re-
flecting the cognitive rules subjects used to distinguish among the 
stimuli.  Again, the best-fitting solution for each sample has three di-
mensions, although they differ among the non-contextualized sam-
ples (Samples 1 through 3).  In Samples 1 and 2 (Figures 2 and 3), 
the three that appear are person vs. property; type of action constituting 
the search; and intrusiveness.  In Sample 3, the type of action dimension 
appears to be replaced by one reflecting degree of permission, that is, a 
judgment about “to what degree would one have permission to do 
such a search?”92 
Our inferences about these dimensions stem from the way in 
which clusters of stimuli fall along them.  Specifically, for the per-
son/property dimension from Samples 1 through 3, the endpoints are 
represented by stimuli such as “body cavity search,” “dog sniff,” and 
“going through magnetometer” at one end, and “search of a newspa-
per office,” “perusing bank records,” and “looking through burned-
 
 89 As we discuss further in the next subsection, providing context made a difference in sub-
jects’ responses and in the dimensional plots that these responses yielded. 
 90 See Davison & Sireci, supra note 87, at 337. 
 91 Id. at 339. 
 92 Note the degree to which this perceived implicit dimension tracks the ultimate legal ques-
tion. 
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down house” at the other.  For these same samples, the intrusiveness 
dimension has similar stimuli at its endpoints, though additional 
stimuli (e.g., “rummaging through suitcase” and “searching foot-
locker”) that clustered with other property stimuli suggests the percep-
tion of intrusiveness by participants along that dimension.  As noted 
above, the second dimension did not appear consistent across Sam-
ples 1 through 3.  For the first two samples, the dimension regarding 
the type of action seemed apparent from clusters along the endpoints 
that included similar stimuli as the first dimension, though the 
spread is different.  Thus, while the first dimension seems to be more 
cleanly represented by a judgment about “what are they searching?  
My person or my property?,” the third dimension seems more cleanly 
represented by a judgment about “what are they doing while search-
ing?  Looking, rummaging, touching?”  In Sample 3 (Figure 4), the 
permission dimension seemed apparent from a cluster of stimuli such 
as “reading a personal diary” and “surrounded by a fence and no tres-
passing signs” at one end and “searching a jail cell” and “searching 
bedroom of probationer.” 
However, providing context had an important effect on the way 
subjects distinguished among stimuli.  The two dimensions reflecting 
person/property and intrusiveness seem to replicate in the contextualized 
samples.  However, a prominent dimension across Samples 4 through 
6 (Figures 5 through 7) reflects the seriousness of the crime that pro-
vided the basis for the search, consistent with Slobogin and 
Schumacher’s “dangerousness” theory.93  That dimension seems to 
replace or supersede the shifting “type of action” or “permission” di-
mensions identified in the non-contextualized samples above.  Our 
inferences for the replicating dimensions are based on stimuli that 
cluster along the ends of the dimension in groupings similar to those 
described above for the no context samples.  Our inferences about 
the seriousness dimension reflect endpoints involving “armed robbery” 
and “stolen car parts” at the more serious endpoint, and “drunken-
ness” and “damage to residence” at the less serious endpoint, with 
more moderately serious crimes at midpoints along that dimension. 
C.  Context and Perceptions of Intrusiveness 
Moreover, recall Slobogin and Schumacher’s hypothesis that con-
text would influence respondents’ ratings of intrusiveness.  Specifi-
cally, they suggested that providing raters with a specific objective for 
 
 93 See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
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a search or seizure would lead to lower perceived “intrusiveness,” be-
cause the search or seizure would seem more justified.  They re-
ported that the hypothesis was confirmed,94 and suggested this leads 
to negative policy implications because evaluators will “systematically 
underestimate the intrusiveness” of a search or seizure.95 
However, some caveats attach to Slobogin and Schumacher’s re-
sults.  First, purely as a statistical matter, the results they reported do 
not clearly match the hypothesis they tested.96  Second, their data 
suggested that providing context mattered, but in different ways for 
different searches.97  For example, in some instances describing the 
goal of the search led to lower ratings of intrusiveness consistent with 
their prediction, but in other instances, context in fact increased in-
trusiveness ratings.  Third, although they inferred that lower intru-
siveness ratings with context are “underestimations,” they simply as-
sumed a priori that the non-contextualized ratings were the 
appropriate normative baseline.98 
To more closely address the question of context, we manipulated 
that variable as well.  Our data also revealed provocative patterns in 
terms of context. 
We found high correlations between overall intrusiveness ratings 
of stimuli in samples with and without context,99 RSample1-Sample4 = 0.84, 
P < 0.001; RSample2-Sample5 = 0.74, P = 0.001; RSample3-Sample6 = 0.97, P < 0.001.  
Superficially, this might suggest that context had no effect on ratings.  
 
 94 Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 6, at 187. 
 95 Id. at 191. 
 96 Slobogin and Schumacher reported a diffuse F-test, testing four experimental conditions.  
The result they reported, showing no difference between “evidence” and “no evidence” 
conditions, would have required a focused test between those two conditions only.  Slo-
bogin & Schumacher, supra note 6, at 187.  They apparently reported a test across all four 
of their subject samples—leading to a diffuse F-test with three degrees of freedom in the 
numerator—where the more precise test of their context hypothesis would combine all 
four samples, leading to a focused F-test with one degree of freedom in the numerator. 
 97 Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 6, at 191–95. 
 98 The authors argue that post hoc evaluations are more likely than non-contextualized 
evaluations to be “incorrect” because case law calls for taking the perspective of an “inno-
cent” defendant.  See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 438 (1991) (stating that “the ‘rea-
sonable person’ test presupposes an innocent person”).  The explanations they give for 
their data rely in part, however, on the evaluators’ assumptions that the defendant is 
more likely than not guilty.  Moreover, although this is a correct statement of case law, 
the Bostick Court was making a different point:  rather than emphasizing the evaluator’s 
belief or assumption of defendant’s guilt, the Court was stating that the degree of intru-
siveness should be viewed from the perspective of a reasonable innocent person.  See id.  
We discuss this issue further infra at notes 111 through 113 and accompanying text. 
 99 Recall that Samples 1, 2, and 3 did not include context; Samples 4, 5, and 6 were identical 
to 1, 2, and 3, respectively, but provided context. 
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But examining the results more closely indicates a number of clear 
differences between the contextualized and non-contextualized sam-
ples. 
First, the dimensions we identified in the best-fitting solution are 
inconsistently correlated across samples.100  That is, in comparing the 
dimensions the MDS solution identifies across samples, some are cor-
related and some are not; and those that are correlated, are not cor-
related in each sample.  Dimension 1, for instance, correlates highly 
between Samples 1 and 4 (R = 0.90, P < 0.001) and 2 and 5 (R = 0.69, 
P = 0.002), but not between Samples 3 and 6 (R = 0.31, P = 0.23).  
The contextualized Dimension 2, on the other hand, is uncorrelated 
with its non-contextualized counterpart across all samples (R’s 
ranged between 0.06 and 0.35, P’s between 0.17 and 0.81).  Dimen-
sion 3, like Dimension 1, varied across samples:  correlated signifi-
cantly between Samples 1 and 4 (R = -0.58, P = 0.015); uncorrelated 
between Samples 2 and 5 (R = 0.13, P = 0.62), and Samples 3 and 6 
(R  = 0.13, P = 0.63). 
Thus, the dimensions identified differ substantially with and with-
out context, as shown in Figures 2 through 7.  Such inconsistent cor-
relations might be expected from dimensions that are related but not 
the same (i.e., that tap different aspects or features of the same 
broad, overarching construct).  And again, at least two dimensions 
seem to repeat across samples, though the third varies in the non-
contextualized samples and changes in the contextualized samples. 
Second, again as might be expected, the stimuli cluster together 
quite differently with and without context, as illustrated more exten-
sively in Tables 3–5.  Third, such a nuanced effect of context is con-
sistent with earlier findings.  Slobogin and Schumacher found that 
context mattered, but inconsistently; sometimes it elevated subjects’ 
intrusiveness ratings, sometimes it decreased those ratings.101  Our da-
ta shows similar patterns. 
Specifically, we conducted a multivariate analyses of variance 
(“MANOVA”) on each of the three context/no-context sample pairs 
examining whether there was an effect of the independent variable 
context on multiple dependent variables (i.e., ratings of each stimu-
lus).  As shown in Table 1, for almost every stimulus (43 of 51), pro-
 
100 Of course, these dimensions are not necessarily identical to the ones we infer above; ra-
ther, they simply reflect the way the plots display subjects’ perceptions of the similarity of 
the stimuli.  Our analysis here demonstrates that these perceptions change when context 
is provided. 
101 Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 6, at 191–95; see also id. at 187. 
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viding context led to a decrease in absolute intrusiveness ratings.102  In 
ten of those instances the decrease was statistically significant below 
the P = 0.05 level; in an additional four, the decrease was significant 
below the P = 0.10 level.  These more focused findings are shown in 
Table 6. 
IV.  DISCUSSION 
We highlight here three useful contributions from the present 
study:  the utility of our methodological approach; substantive doc-
trinal implications for Fourth Amendment law and policy; and impli-
cations for further research. 
A.  Methodological 
Multidimensional scaling is a valuable methodology for digging 
more deeply into individual judgments about concepts and con-
structs; at its broadest, it is useful in any context in which similarities 
among stimuli may be of interest or in which we are interested in un-
derstanding what the basis might be for people’s judgments or per-
ceptions.  Here, we used the approach to decompose people’s per-
ceptions of “privacy” and violations of privacy.  Rather than simply 
examining privacy as a “unitary concept with a uniform value,”103 we 
confirmed that it is a multifactor construct, best thought of as reflect-
ing three different, albeit related, dimensions.  Our analysis empha-
sizes the importance of not looking at such broad concepts as unidi-
mensional, and not focusing solely on one variable (such as 
“intrusiveness”) in seeking to capture understandings of the con-
cepts.  If nothing else, taking this approach helps broaden the tool-
box of empirical legal studies.  More profitably though, it helps elu-
cidate researchers’ understandings of how individuals see “privacy,” 
and can help courts and policymakers in fashioning Fourth Amend-
ment doctrine. 
 
102 These findings are consistent with—and, indeed, stronger than—Slobogin and Schu-
macher’s predictions. 
   The following stimuli showed an increase in absolute intrusiveness ratings when con-
text was provided:  following pedestrian in police car, looking at foliage in public park, 
flying 400 yards over backyard in helicopter, search of house over husband’s objection 
when wife gives consent, shining flashlight down dark alley next to home, searching jail 
cell, pat-down at border, and searching bedroom of probationer.  Of these, only flying 
400 yards over backyard in helicopter increased ratings at a significant level, R = -0.27, 
P = 0.047. 
103 Solove, Taxonomy, supra note 14, at 480. 
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B.  Substantive 
Specifically, our findings of multidimensionality and context ef-
fects have substantive implications.  First, despite the Court’s appar-
ent focus on broad constructs such as “intrusiveness” or “expectations 
of privacy,” it is clear that those broad concepts subsume more spe-
cific, narrower ones that influence how each broad concept is per-
ceived.  Proponents might emphasize the flexibility inherent in such 
broad concepts.104  Importantly, however, these narrower features 
likely vary substantially across cases and fact patterns, and can lead to 
quite different expectations of privacy on the part of the target of the 
search, as well as different understandings of those expectations on 
the evaluator’s part.  To the extent that additional research indicates 
that such narrower features are emphasized differently and systemati-
cally by different groups—i.e., the target of the search, the conductor 
of the search, and the evaluators of the search’s appropriateness—
courts and policymakers may need to address whether legal standards 
should accommodate these different emphases.105  Depending on the 
privilege to be accorded lay intuitions, it might be that the Court’s 
standard for judging “reasonable expectations of privacy” will need 
refinement in order to account for changes depending on certain 
facts of the case, characteristics of the actors in a case, or characteris-
tics of reviewers of the case. 
Second, the attention subjects paid to the “seriousness” of the 
crime, leading to the dimension identified in Samples 4 through 6, is 
worthy of note.  Slobogin and Schumacher posited a similar feature—
the “dangerousness” of criminal activity—to explain some of their 
findings.106  For them, “to the extent an intrusiveness rating is based 
on the . . . fear of the criminal activity investigated, it should be inva-
lid for Fourth Amendment purposes[, and] . . . . should not normally 
affect measurement of the action’s insult to privacy or autonomy.”107  
That is, at a doctrinal level, an unjustified warrantless search of a bed-
room is equally intrusive whether the object of the search is a crack 
pipe, counterfeit money, or a dirty bomb in a suitcase.  Similarly, an 
unjustified pat down should be equally unacceptable whether on the 
 
104 Cf. Marc R. Poirier, The Virtue of Vagueness in Takings Doctrine, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 93 
(2002) (arguing, in an eminent domain context, that doctrinal “vagueness” allows for 
flexibility when appropriate). 
105 Cf. Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe?  Scott v. Harris and the Perils of 
Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837 (2009). 
106 Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 6, at 195. 
107 Id. 
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street or at an airport, regardless of the National Threat Level.  Our 
subjects’ focus (and that of Slobogin and Schumacher’s subjects) on 
the seriousness or dangerousness of the criminal activity in question, 
however, might suggest that they do not share that perspective, and 
that the purpose of a search justifiably plays a role in evaluating it—
typically leading to lower perceived intrusiveness.108  The Court has 
certainly acknowledged a long-standing doctrine allowing “exigent 
circumstances” to justify otherwise inappropriate searches.  This doc-
trine has been narrowly construed, however, typically applied under 
circumstances that might lead to the destruction of evidence.  More-
over, the Court has expressly rejected the idea that “the seriousness 
of the offense under investigation itself creates exigent circumstances 
of the kind that under the Fourth Amendment justify a warrantless 
search.”109  As in the example above, if further research bears out 
these findings, there will be an important disconnect between black-
letter law and lay perceptions.  In this and other research in the crim-
inal law context, such disconnect can occasion substantial debate 
over its consequences:  to the extent the two perspectives differ, 
which should change?110 
Third, we found, consistent with Slobogin and Schumacher, that 
when the context of a search is provided—typically information about 
the crime under investigation, or perhaps the evidence or informa-
tion sought—the search is evaluated differently.  In our sample, even 
more than in those researchers’, ratings of intrusiveness decreased 
when such information was provided. 
Those researchers saw such context effects as troubling, suggest-
ing that they could lead to courts and law enforcement officials un-
derestimating the degree of intrusiveness of a particular search.111  
However, as noted above, it is not clear a priori that evaluators are 
necessarily underestimating intrusiveness; it could be that non-
contextualized judgments might be overestimating intrusiveness.  That 
is, Slobogin and Schumacher assumed that the abstract judgment was 
the correct one as both a doctrinal and a psychological matter.  Doc-
 
108 See Table 6. 
109 Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394 (1978).  Under a related doctrine, the “knock-and-
announce rule,” a dangerous situation may constitute exigent circumstances.  E.g., Wilson 
v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 936 (1995).  Under Mincey, however, that does not appear to be 
the case under the “expectations of privacy” approach. 
110 Compare ROBINSON & DARLEY, supra note 53, with Blumenthal, Who Decides?, supra note 53.  
See also Kahan et al., supra note 105. 
111 Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 6, at 191. 
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trinally, that may not be so112; psychologically, it is not clear that there 
are explicit grounds for making such a choice. 
Moreover, in practice, such context effects may be of less import, 
because judges will always be presented with context in making their 
decisions, whether issuing a warrant or ruling on admissibility.  Out-
side of court, however, the context effects might be of more rele-
vance.  In setting policy, for instance, legislation about the scope of 
law enforcement authority to conduct searches would be framed in 
the abstract—that is, in non-contextualized terms—but would thus be 
seen as more intrusive.  However, when a search is actually conducted 
under such authority, the context will lead to it being perceived as 
less intrusive.  Invasive conduct may thus be seen as less so in prac-
tice,113 a circumstance both salutary and discomfiting.  That is, it may 
be comforting that apparently broad search authority might be seen 
as more acceptable when the purpose of the search is understood or 
placed in context; on the other hand, this is precisely what concerns 
contemporary civil rights advocates:  the idea that justifying such au-
thority in one way can lead to that power being broadened beyond its 
appropriate scope.  Clearly, this issue as well is one for further discus-
sion and research, both normative and empirical. 
CONCLUSION 
Recent theoretical work has sought to articulate a descriptive 
framework for the Court’s privacy decisions and privacy scholarship 
overall,114 and for Fourth Amendment search-and-seizure doctrine in 
particular.115  The empirical approach taken here expands upon such 
theoretical work.  Although the present data are preliminary, they set 
the stage for a research agenda that develops our understandings of 
“expectations of privacy” from an empirical perspective, elaborating 
and providing insight into Fourth Amendment doctrine.116 
 
112 See supra note 98. 
113 As just one example from the present data, note the drop of almost 1.5 points (on only a 
five-point scale) when “pat-down” is instead presented as “pat-down (at airport after ter-
rorist threat).”  See Table 1. 
114 See supra note 14. 
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APPENDIX 
Table 1.  Overall Ratings of Intrusiveness of Stimuli, with Slobogin and 
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116  The Randolph fact pattern was not included in Slobogin and Schumacher’s sample. 
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Table 2.  R2 Fit Statistics for Each Stimuli Set. 
 
STIMULI SET 
1 2 3 













R2 R2 R2 R2 R2 R2 
1 0.566 0.547 0.571 0.499 0.556 0.44 
2 0.739 0.736 0.783 0.634 0.635 0.648 
3 0.853 0.827 0.899 0.793 0.745 0.784 
4 0.889 0.896 0.931 0.848 0.841 0.851 
5 0.925 0.929 0.96 0.931 0.853 0.903 
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Table 3.  Clusters for Stimuli with and without Context for Stimuli Set 1. 
 
 WITHOUT CONTEXT WITH CONTEXT 
Searching a private junkyard (stolen 
car parts) 
Searching a private junkyard (stolen 
car parts) 
Search of newspaper office (picture)  
Searching yacht at sea (drugs)  
Looking in trunk of car on public 
street (evidence of armed robbery) 
Looking in trunk of car on public 
street (evidence of armed robbery) 
CLUSTER 1 
Search of a bedroom (money) Search of a bedroom (money) 
Going through magnetometer at 
airport (weapons) 
Going through magnetometer at 
airport (weapons) 
Dog sniff of body (drugs) Dog sniff of body (drugs) 
Rummaging through suitcase at air-
port (drugs) 
Rummaging through suitcase at air-
port (drugs) 
Searching high school kid's purse 
(cigarettes) 
Searching high school kid's purse 
(cigarettes) 
Searching footlocker found in car 
(drugs) 
Searching footlocker found in car 
(drugs) 
Boarding a bus and asking to search 
luggage (drugs) 
Boarding a bus and asking to search 
luggage (drugs) 
Body cavity search at border (drugs) Body cavity search at border (drugs) 
CLUSTER 2 
 Searching yacht at sea (drugs) 
Following pedestrian in police car 
(determine destination) 
Following pedestrian in police car 
(determine destination) 
CLUSTER 3 Stopping drivers at roadblock for 30-
second questioning at night (drunk-
enness) 
Stopping drivers at roadblock for 30-
second questioning at night (drunk-
enness) 
Inspecting plumbing and wiring of 
residence (damage) 
Inspecting plumbing and wiring of 
residence (damage) 
Looking through burned-down 
house (evidence of arson) 
Looking through burned-down 
house (evidence of arson) 
Perusing bank records (illegal 
funds) 
Perusing bank records (illegal 
funds) 
CLUSTER 4 
 Search of newspaper office (picture) 
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Table 4.  Clusters for Stimuli with and without Context for Stimuli Set 2. 
 
 WITHOUT CONTEXT WITH CONTEXT 
Inspecting kitchen of restaurant 
(health code violations) 
Inspecting kitchen of restaurant 
(health code violations) 
Looking in foliage at public park 
(murder weapon) 
 
Going through garbage in opaque 
bags at curbside (forgery) 
Going through garbage in opaque 
bags at curbside (forgery) 
Searching a coal mine (safety viola-
tions) 
Searching a coal mine (safety viola-
tions) 
Inspecting exterior of car in public 
lot (blood stains) 
 
Searching a college dormitory 
(drugs) 
Searching a college dormitory 
(drugs) 
Searching a garage (contraband) Searching a garage (contraband) 
CLUSTER 1 
Searching a 6th grader's locker 
(drugs) 
Searching a 6th grader's locker 
(drugs) 
Pat-down (at airport after terrorist 
threat) 
Pat-down (at airport after terrorist 
threat) 
Fingerprinting in police car (--) Fingerprinting in police car (--) 
Planting chauffeur as undercover 
agent (organized crime)  
Using secretary as undercover agent 
(organized crime)  
Monitoring a phone for 30 days 
(gambling) 
 
Arrest, handcuffing, and detention 
for 48 hours (rape charges) 
 
 Inspecting exterior of car in public 
lot (blood stains) 
CLUSTER 2 
 Looking in foliage at public park 
(murder weapon) 
Hospital surgery, shoulder (bullet)  
Needle in arm at work to get blood 
(drug usage) 
Needle in arm at work to get blood 
(drug usage) CLUSTER 3 
 Flying 400 yards over backyard in 
helicopter (marijuana) 
Flying 400 yards over backyard in 
helicopter (marijuana) 
 
 Monitoring a phone for 30 days 
(gambling) 
 
Planting chauffeur as undercover 
agent (organized crime) 
CLUSTER 4 
 Using secretary as undercover agent 
(organized crime) 
N/A Arrest, handcuffing, and detention 
for 48 hours (rape charges) CLUSTER 5 
 Hospital surgery shoulder (bullet) 
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Table 5.  Clusters for Stimuli with and without Context for Stimuli Set 3. 
 
 WITHOUT CONTEXT WITH CONTEXT 
Reading a personal diary (embez-
zlement) 
Reading a personal diary (embez-
zlement) 
Watching person in front yard with 
binoculars (see who is there) 
 
Search of cornfields surrounded by 
fence and No Trespassing signs 
(marijuana) 
 
 Tapping into corporation's com-
puter (fraud) 
CLUSTER 1 
 Obtaining a voiceprint (--) 
Using a beeper to track car (sus-
pected drug dealer) 
Using a beeper to track car (sus-
pected drug dealer) 
Tapping into corporation's com-
puter (fraud) 
 
Shining flashlight down dark alley 
next to home (drug transaction) 
 
 Accompanying to urinal at work and 
listening for urination (drug usage) 
 Questioning on public sidewalk for 
10 minutes (determine destination) 
CLUSTER 2 
 Watching person in front yard with 
binoculars (see who is there) 
Search of house over husband's obj-
ection when wife consents (drugs) 
Search of house over husband's obj-
ection when wife consents (drugs) 
Searching drawers at office (theft) Searching drawers at office (theft) 
Searching mobile home (drugs) Searching mobile home (drugs) 
 Searching jail cell (conspiracy) 
 Searching bedroom of probationer 
(illegal gun) 
 Searching interior of car on public 
highway (weapons) 
 
Search of cornfields surrounded by 
fence and No Trespassing signs 
(marijuana) 
CLUSTER 3 
 Shining flashlight down dark alley 
next to home (drug transaction) 
Pat-down at border (drugs) Pat-down at border (drugs) 
Searching jail cell (conspiracy)  
Obtaining a voiceprint (–)  
Questioning on public sidewalk for 
10 minutes (determine destination) 
 
Searching bedroom of probationer 
(illegal gun) 
 




Stopping all drivers at roadblock to 
view occupants (illegal immigration) 
Stopping all drivers at roadblock to 
view occupants (illegal immigration) 
CLUSTER 5 Accompanying to urinal at work and 
listening for urination (drug usage) 
n/a 
Note:  Items that are located in different clusters in the context condition are in bold. 
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Table 6.  Significant Context Differences in Intrusiveness Ratings. 
 
STIMULUS CONTEXT 
(GOAL OF SEARCH) 








Evidence of arson Lower <.001 
Perusing bank records Illegal funds Lower <.001 
Inspecting kitchen of 
restaurant 
Health code violations Lower <.001 
Pat-down117 At airport after terror-
ist threat 
Lower <.001 
Reading a personal diary Embezzlement Lower .01 
Inspecting wiring and 
plumbing of residence 
Damage Lower .011 
Searching high school 
kid’s purse 
Cigarettes Lower .031 
Searching footlocker 
found in car 
Drugs Lower .013 
Inspecting exterior of car 
in public lot 
Blood stains Lower .021 
Arrest, handcuffing, and 
detention for 48 hours118 
Rape charges Lower .015 
Rummaging through 
suitcase at airport119 
Drugs Lower .089 
Monitoring a phone for 
30 days 
Gambling Lower .062 
Going through garbage 
in opaque bags at curb-
side 
Forgery Lower .09 
Hospital surgery on 
shoulder 
Bullet Lower .086 
Flying 400 yards over 
backyard in helicopter 








117 In Slobogin and Schumacher’s analysis, context lowered this stimulus’s intrusiveness rat-
ing substantially as well, from an overall ranking (out of 50) of 27 to an overall ranking of 
9.  Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 6, at 192 tbl.2. 
118 In Slobogin and Schumacher’s analysis, context lowered this stimulus’s intrusiveness rat-
ing substantially as well, from an overall ranking (out of 50) of 31 to an overall ranking of 
26.  Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 6, at 192 tbl.2. 
119 In Slobogin and Schumacher’s analysis, context elevated this stimulus’s intrusiveness rat-
ing substantially, from an overall ranking (out of 50) of 25 to an overall ranking of 33.  
Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 6, at 192 tbl.2. 
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Figure 1.  Scree plots for each set of stimuli of stress values for n-dimensions. 
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Figure 7c.  Two-Dimensional Plot of Dimensions 2 and 3 (Sample 6). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
